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Abstract 
Our work contributes to the literature as we theoretically argue for and empirically 
examine, for the first time, a triangular relationship between concern among citizens 
about the environment, media attention to environmental issues, and policy output. 
Previous work has studied these relationships, but analyzed the respective links rather 
in isolation from each other. This research has significant implications for the 
understanding of environmental policymaking and, more generally, informs the debate 
on whether politicians respond to what voters want and under what circumstances this 
occurs. 
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How does environmental policy output respond to citizens’ concern and media coverage? Are 
public attitudes and media coverage assuaged when governments act? We theoretically argue 
for and empirically examine a triangular relationship between policy output, concern among 
citizens about the environment, and media coverage, in which each variable is influenced by 
the other two, creating an endogenous system. 
Political outcomes in democratic systems tend to respond to changes in the public’s left-
right policy mood (Stimson et al. 1995). To varying degrees across domains, public spending 
is also shaped by relative policy preferences, because politicians may anticipate electoral 
advantage from accommodating citizen demand (Wlezien 1995, 2004). And even specific 
aspects of environmental policy are influenced by citizens’ views (Johnson et al. 2005). 
Statistical work of the responsiveness of public policy is complemented by studies using 
ethnographic methods, which suggest that leaders attend to public concerns (Boswell et al. 
2019). Hence, politicians, assumed to be office-seeking, take into account citizens’ concerns 
about political issues, including the environment, which in turn affects how governments 
respond (Anderson et al. 2017). Alongside the public’s influence on policy, mass media attract 
policymakers’ attention and thus potentially shape policy outputs (e.g., Sevenans 2018), while 
media coverage can influence the public’s views about political issues under some 
circumstances (Barnes and Hicks 2018, see also Elenbaas et al. 2013, Bakaki and Bernauer 
2017a, Murphy and Devine 2019). We extend and widen the scope of research on public 
opinion, policy output, and media coverage, thereby making one central contribution.  
Specifically, we examine how policy outputs, public opinion, and mass media coverage are 
related to and influence each other. We suggest that these three variables form a system in 
which each is related to the others. Earlier research provides some support for linkages between 
media, public opinion, and policy output. However, these contributions have focused on 
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bivariate relationships and often assume that each relationship is unidirectional. We believe 
that specifying and examining a triangular system, jointly for the first time while recognizing 
reciprocal links and endogeneity, will shed new light on the persistent empirical ambiguity 
about how public opinion, media coverage, and environmental policy outputs are related to 
each other. Parts of this system can usefully be thought of as operating according to what 
Downs (1972) calls the ‘issue-attention cycle,’ whereby public concern – and, as we argue, 
media attention – is assuaged when politicians attend to the environment by developing 
policies. We claim that carefully modelling this system is crucial for furthering our 
understanding of what the public wants, whether politicians implement this in the 
environmental context, and which role media coverage plays. 
 
A triangular relationship 
The study of environmental policy output is strongly related to how states, and particularly 
democracies, perceive the need for ambitious environmental programs. Other research 
discusses how public opinion is related to environmental policymaking and outputs by 
examining people’s preferences toward climate change and mitigation (e.g., Krosnick et al. 
2006, Drews and Van den Bergh 2011). And there is an emerging debate about the role of mass 
media in shaping environmental politics (e.g., Meyer and Hinchman 2002, Gavin 2009). For 
the first time, we propose that these are not only bilateral relationships, but instead a triangular 
relationship is formed comprising reciprocal links between outputs, public opinion, and media 
coverage. Hence, theoretically and empirically, the effects of each variable on the others must 
be estimated as part of a system of simultaneous relationships.  
The influences we ultimately expect are summarized in Figure 1: public opinion and media 
coverage are likely to be mutually reinforcing; public opinion should be positively related to 
policy outputs, but the latter is likely to exert a negative impact on public opinion; finally, 
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media coverage is expected to be positively associated with policy outputs, but media attention 
may lower as soon as legislative action occurs. We argue for the need to examine the potential 
interdependencies between these factors. Because they form a system in which each is 
endogenous, failure to allow for reciprocal influences could lead to biased effect estimates. 
Interestingly, the recent literature has begun to recognize the importance of dealing with 
endogeneity in this context. Liu et al. (2011) argue for a simultaneous relationship between 
Congressional attention to and US media coverage of climate change in 1969-2005. They 
report that changes in the level of problem indicators, focusing events, and feedback from the 
scientific community affect attention, but they do not find cross effects from media coverage 
to Congressional attention. We follow Liu et al. (2011) in treating legislative action and media 
attention as endogenous, but we focus on legislative output, while allowing for endogeneity 
and considering additionally the effect of public opinion. 
 
Figure 1. Triangular relationship of policy output, public opinion, and mass media 
 
Public opinion and policy output 
Environmental quality is frequently seen as a public good and, generally, democracies have a 
stronger commitment to providing public goods than non-democracies (Bättig and Bernauer 
2009, Cao and Ward 2015, Böhmelt et al. 2016). In democracies, competition for office drives 
policy toward what the median voter wants (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2010). In comparison to 
authoritarian governments, democracies have larger winning coalitions, i.e., the group of 
individuals whose support is decisive for politicians to obtain or to retain office. Using private 
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goods to gain support has higher costs relative to the provision of public goods when winning 
coalitions are large, though (Cao and Ward 2015), and democratic leaders not responding to 
public demands eventually lose support and can be more easily removed from office than 
autocrats (e.g., Böhmelt and Butkute 2018). Several authors suggest then that, in an effort to 
provide public goods, democracies are likely to commit to environmental policies (e.g., Bättig 
and Bernauer 2009, Schaffer and Bernauer 2014). There is, in fact, evidence that policymakers 
respond to increased public demand for pro-environmental policies (Agnone 2007, Anderson 
2011, Weaver 2008, Vandeweerdt et al. 2016, Anderson et al. 2017). At the same time, lack of 
public concern impedes the low-carbon transition (Geels 2013).  
Policy output is thus expected to respond to citizens’ preferences, but punctuated-
equilibrium theory suggests that changes in public opinion are the decisive factor (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2012, see also Baumgartner 2006). Typically, policy output is incremental, due 
to lack of attention by politicians and because special interests accrete around the status-quo to 
block change (Walgrave and Dejaeghere 2016). Only occasionally do issues advance into the 
macro-political realm where major policy shifts occur propelled by significant changes in 
public opinion. In sum, if there is sufficient support in democracies, policy outputs may respond 
to positive swings in public opinion (e.g., Agnone 2007, Anderson 2011, Weaver 2008, 
Vandeweerdt et al. 2016, Anderson et al. 2017). However, what is missing in this literature is 
an examination of how policy outputs affect public opinion. A reciprocal relationship seems 
plausible as, for example, demand for political action may decrease when policies have been 
put in place (Wlezien 1995, 2004). 
According to Downs’ issue-attention cycle (1972),1 policy output goes through phases in 
which public concern is assuaged once politicians address it with legislative action. Similar to 
                                                          
1 Note, however, that Downs has been criticized for ignoring the way issue interlinkage can increase or suppress 
attention, for postulating too many cycle stages, and for neglecting the way that attention can be sustained when 
new institutional structures emerge (see Gupta and Jenkins-Smith 2015). It may also not account for the empirical 
pattern in relation to all aspects of public opinion about environmental issues (Holt and Barkemeyer 2012), though 
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punctuated-equilibrium theory, underlying beliefs must be translated into the perception that 
the issue is sufficiently salient before policy outputs can occur. However, once the new 
regulatory regime is in place, citizens become aware of its costs, which sets off a downswing 
in issue salience or even public support (Downs 1972, p.40-41). Some citizens simply become 
uninterested in the issue (Downs 1972, p.41).2 On this basis, we expect a positive relationship 
between changes in public opinion and policy output, but a negative feedback loop from policy 
output to public opinion. 
 
Media attention and public opinion 
While much is already known about the individual-level correlates of environmental public 
concern (e.g., Bakaki and Bernauer 2017a,b, 2018), macro-level influences are less well 
understood. That said, among plausible determinants are different levels of media attention to 
environmental issues (Oehl et al. 2017). In general, the literature stresses the power of the 
media to set the public agenda (McCombs 2005, Dearing and Rogers 1996, Jones and 
Baumgartner 2012), while Iyengar and Kinder (2010) argue that mass media also affect the 
attention citizens pay to certain issues. In turn, topics that make it onto the public agenda shape 
public opinion (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2001, Murphy and Devine 2019). Environmental 
politics and the demand for ‘greener’ policies are unlikely to be an exception here. Mass media 
might play an important role in creating public awareness of environmental issues (Slovic 
2000, Oehl et al. 2017, Barnes and Hicks 2018). The amount of information on environmental 
issues, in particular climate change, available to the public has increased considerably over the 
                                                          
Downs (1972) suggested that cycles are more likely to occur in some conditions, e.g., including benefits of action 
being concentrated in a minority with costs widely spread.  
2 In contrast to the issue-attention cycle, the thermostatic model postulates that, where citizens’ preferences vary, 
policy responds to the difference between the level of policy and the median citizen’s preferred level (Wlezien 
1995) or the public’s average left-right policy mood (Stimson et al. 1995), resulting in negative feedback if policy 
overshoots the level citizens desire. Considering variation in public attitudes towards environmental policy across 
US states and across time, Johnson et al. (2005) find evidence for a thermostatic feedback effect reducing public 
concern when policy outputs are accompanied by actual improvement in water-pollution levels. 
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recent past (e.g., Kahan et al. 2012). In this context, some propose that the media can raise 
public awareness about environmental issues even among the least interested (see Dolan et al. 
2012).  
However, media coverage of climate change is usually of relatively low intensity and mass 
media may have only a modest influence on citizens’ views and attitudes concerning 
environmental issues (Elenbaas et al. 2013, Bakaki and Bernauer 2017a, Oehl et al. 2017), 
although coverage and impact can peak around ‘big events’ such as the UNFCCC’s 
Conferences of the Parties (Schmidt et al. 2013, Barkemeyer et al. 2017). And indeed, Scruggs 
and Benegal (2012) argue that the economic downturn of 2008 provides a more plausible 
explanation than the influence of media coverage on public opinion in the US, and certainly 
not all media coverage of climate change is prone to lead to greater public support for more 
ambitious policies: climate skepticism has become an important phenomenon, much of it 
emanating from right-wing think tanks and appearing in the ‘blogoshere’ (see also Boykoff 
2013, Elsasser and Dunlap 2013). However, our empirical focus is on newspaper coverage.  
There are relatively few quantitative-comparative studies of climate skepticism in 
newspapers. Painter and Ashe (2012) analyze newspaper coverage in the US, UK, France, 
India, China, and Brazil in 2007-2008 (when the IPCC’s 4th Report was published) and 2009-
10 (when the ‘Climategate’ scandal about the possible suppression of negative voices among 
the climate-science community broke out). Overall, climate skepticism was a relatively minor 
signal, occurring in around 12% of the newspaper coverage of climate change. That said, there 
was variation across countries, skepticism being considerably more prominent in US 
newspapers (where it occurred in around 33% of coverage in 2009-10) and somewhat more in 
the UK (ca. 18% of coverage in 2009-10). In the UK, skepticism was particularly prominent in 
the right-of center press (also see Boykoff and Mansfield 2008). Based on an extensive survey 
of single-country qualitative and quantitative studies, Arnold et al. (2016) report little evidence 
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for climate change skepticism in German, Norwegian, or French newspapers, though. While 
we cannot rule out the possibility of significant skeptical newspaper coverage in all European 
countries in our sample, we expect much of the coverage to reflect the consensus among climate 
scientists.  
Taking all these arguments together, we suggest a positive feedback loop between public 
opinion and media coverage. Media coverage focuses on the more salient issues and this should 
be driven by public demand. When media gatekeepers come to regard a heavily-covered issue 
as stale, competitive pressures on available column-inches and journalistic resources may make 
them turn to what appears as more newsworthy issues. However, while public opinion is 
trending upwards, the media is likely to respond positively with more coverage, which induces 
the feedback between public opinion and media coverage.  
 
Media attention and policy output 
The ‘mediatization’ of politics over the past few decades underlines that media coverage is a 
dynamic and potentially highly influential force impacting on policymaking (Meyer and 
Hinchman 2002, Jones and Baumgartner 2012, Gavin 2009). For instance, in 1986, the German 
news magazine ‘Der Spiegel’ picked up on a report about climate change from a group of 
German scientists and ran an article under the heading ‘The Climate Catastrophe,’ with an 
iconic front cover showing Cologne Cathedral partially submerged by floodwaters. The term 
climate catastrophe became a discursive frame for the debate in Germany over the next thirty 
years (Oreskes et al. 2018, p.161). 
Early discussions of the relationship between mass media and policymaking centered on the 
idea that the media occupy a liaison role between citizens and governments (Siebert et al. 1956, 
Baum and Potter 2008). Later on, work on the media-policy link became primarily the domain 
of agenda-setting research (Dearing and Rogers 1996). Media coverage can drive the political 
9 
 
agenda and, in turn, environmental policy outputs (e.g., Trenz 2004): politicians may believe 
that the public is influenced by the media and then act on this premise; hence, media coverage 
is seen as a reflection of what the citizenry demand (Herbst 2002, Perloff 2002, Kepplinger 
2007, Sevenans 2018). Policymakers, therefore, have incentives to process information in news 
media (Yanovitzky 2002), with unresponsiveness to the agenda potentially compromising their 
position (Edwards and Wood 1999, Oehl et al. 2017, Sevenans 2018). On the other hand, 
legislators strategically use the media to promote policies. Favorable coverage may increase 
their ability to get their policies successfully adopted and implemented (Holt and Barkemeyer 
2012). In this manner, they can win important political gains with key constituencies (Edwards 
and Wood 1999, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006).  
Eventually, media coverage should indirectly influence policy output via its effects on 
public opinion, and there exists plausibly a direct impact as well. This occurs through 
informational and framing channels. Policymakers react to media coverage due to the 
information it contains; furthermore, there is a media-channel effect due to specific information 
the media reports (see also Sevenans 2018). Hence, what is covered, and the way in which this 
is done, frames the way politicians think. At the same time, the media tend to report on issues 
that are salient, both because of the journalistic norm that significant public issues should be 
addressed and as levels of readership are important to revenue streams (Hilgartner and Bosk 
1988, Gupta and Jenkins-Smith 2015).3 To illustrate this, consider the Fukushima-Daiichi 
nuclear accident, which sparked a significant media campaign against nuclear energy in 
Germany. At least partially, this may have led to the government’s decision to push more 
strongly for a nuclear power phase-out. But after legislative action took place, public interest 
declined and the media adjusted their coverage. In this regard, media gatekeepers react in a 
                                                          
3 Holt and Barkemeyer (2012) find that a series of issue-attention cycles characterize media coverage of climate 
change, but that media attention to sustainable development might best be characterized step jumps in coverage 
that do not return to previous low levels as implied by Downs (1972). 
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similar manner to the way in which Downs (1972) postulates voters react once politicians have 
dealt with an issue. In addition, if policy outputs assuage public concern and falling public 
concern leads to reduced media coverage, there is an indirect negative feedback loop between 
policy outputs and media coverage. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between media 
coverage and policy output,4 but a negative influence from policy output to media attention. 
 
Research design 
We compiled data for six established European democracies between 1983 and 2012: the UK, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Germany. The country-year is our unit of analysis, 
while the sample-countries and the time period are predetermined by data availability. The 
selection of states and years is thus entirely driven by data-availability criteria. As a result, 
there is no theoretical selection criterion for our sample except for states being democracies: 
the claim we develop is unlikely to apply in non-democratic environments.  
Because of reciprocal influences of our three simultaneous-equations system, we rely on 
three-stage least-squares (3SLS) models. This estimation procedure combines seemingly-
unrelated regression (SUR) with two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS). That is, 3SLS is 
suitable in a system of equations that are endogenous, i.e., in each equation there are 
endogenous variables on both the left and right-hand sides of the equation. This is the 2SLS 
component. On the other hand, 3SLS directly takes into account that the error terms in each 
equation are correlated, which is the SUR element. The combination of these two components 
is the key strength of 3SLS, but the main challenge is finding instruments for the main 
variables. We, therefore, discuss the validity of our approach and assess the strengths of our 
                                                          
4 That said, media attention may not lead to more ambitious environmental policy outputs (see Lloyd 2004, Davis 
2002, Lewis et al. 2008a,b). For instance, the media could misinterpret information (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004), 
which then has little impact or influence on policymaking. Environmental issues may also not be high enough on 




instruments in the appendix. We treat as endogenous variables policy output, media attention 
to environmental issues, and concern among citizens about the environment, which are fed into 
3SLS in the following three steps.  
First, all exogenous variables in the system are used to create the instrumented values of the 
endogenous items. As we outline below, we identify one unique instrument per endogenous 
variable, while controlling for unit-level fixed effects and a temporal trend. Therefore, we use 
all of these items to generate the instrumented values of the endogenous items. Second, 3SLS 
estimates a cross-equation covariance matrix. Third, we calculate the simultaneous equations 
with the three endogenized variables via generalized least squares, employing the instrumented 
variables and the exogenous items (i.e., unique instruments, fixed effects, and the time trend) 
as well as the estimated covariance matrix. We include country fixed effects alongside the 
substantive predictors to capture any time-invariant forms of cross-section heterogeneity as 
well as a linear time trend to address temporal autocorrelation more generally in each of the 
three equations. Finally, we incorporate temporally lagged dependent variables, which control 
for within-state path dependencies. 
 
Variables and data sources – Environmental policy output stage 
The first endogenous (outcome) variable focuses on policy outputs that could improve 
environmental quality. One of the most significant environmental problems of our time is 
climate change, and it is strongly related to countries’ energy policies (Schaffer and Bernauer 
2014). Moreover, a key step to limiting the effects of climate change and transitioning to a low-
carbon society is the de-carbonization of the energy sector (OECD/IEA/NEA/ITF 2015). 
Accordingly, we employ a measure of states’ renewable energy policies for the first 
endogenous item using data from the IRENA/IEA Global Renewable Energy Policies and 
Measures database. We concentrate on national policies and measures (henceforth, for brevity, 
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policies) pertaining to one of the following categories: economic instruments, information and 
education, policy support, regulatory instruments, research and development, and voluntary 
approaches. The date each policy came into force and ended is provided by the IRENA/IEA 
database, and we used this information to code a variable counting the number of renewable 
energy policies a state has introduced in each year over our sample period. As Cao and Ward 
(2017, p.89f) emphasize, this variable ‘is more closely related to climate change [than general 
measures of the stringency of environmental policy].’ After accounting for missing values, we 
have 77 country-year observations with a mean value of 1.57 new policies introduced per year 
(standard deviation of 1.77). 
To instrument policy outputs, we need a variable that is directly associated with this 
measure, but not the other endogenous items described below. Considering several theoretical 
claims and after a series of empirical checks, we identified a one-year lagged binary natural 
disaster variable as the instrument of our choice: governments tend to respond to natural 
disasters, though not always with appropriate policies that consider second-order effects 
(Neumayer et al. 2014). Moreover, there is evidence that policymakers react to environmental 
influences by implementing environmental policies after natural disasters (Bechtel and 
Hainmueller 2011). To this end, we use the EM-DAT International Disaster Database to code 
all climatological, geophysical, hydrological, and meteorological disasters per year. To 
minimize likely bias stemming from coding or measurement error, we transformed this 
information into a binary item that receives a value of 1 if at least one such disaster occurred 
in a given year (0 otherwise). Dichotomizing this item also helps meeting the instrumental-
variable requirements of the estimator, which, e.g., a count variable does not. The crucial 
advantage of this Disaster Onset dummy (mean value of 0.69; standard deviation of 0.47) is 
that, unlike factors such as carbon dioxide emissions, it is truly exogenous to any of the three 




Variables and data sources – Environmental public opinion 
The second endogenous variable is based on the Eurobarometer survey. The EU Commission 
has conducted such surveys since the 1970s. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer does not ask 
the same question(s) in every survey, most questions are not about renewable energy or climate 
change, and question formulations differ. With a view to capturing our theoretical concept as 
closely as possible while maximizing country-year coverage, we opted for a combination of 
two Eurobarometer survey items. First, there is the question on whether respondents thought 
that fighting pollution is (4) not at all important, (3) of little importance, (2) important, and (1) 
very important. The item has not been included in all Eurobarometer surveys and this question 
was replaced by another ordinally scaled question in some, and particularly in more recent, 
surveys: ‘please tell me, for the problem of protecting nature and fighting pollution, whether 
you personally consider it a very important problem (1), important (2), of little importance (3), 
or not at all important (4).’ Both items should strongly correlate with the unobserved public 
view on climate change and renewable energy.  
We combined these two survey questions as follows: we first dropped the ‘don’t know’ 
answers and missing values. Afterwards, we merged both variables as they follow the same 
scale and inverted the result, so that higher values pertain to a more favorable attitude toward 
environmental quality. Third, we aggregated this individual-level information to the country 
level by averaging across respondents. We thus compiled a variable measuring the average 
public mood toward protecting nature and fighting pollution, which theoretically ranges in [1; 
4] with higher values indicating that a larger share of respondents perceives environmental 
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protection as important. Finally, we subtracted the variable’s values in t-1 from current values. 
Our final item has a mean value of 0.065 and a standard deviation of 0.49.5  
To instrument public opinion, we used annual data on median voter preferences from the 
Eurobarometer’s item that asks respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale from 1 
(left) to 10 (right). We incorporated the lagged median-voter position in the empirical analysis 
and focused on inter-annual changes. Changes in the median voter are directly tied to public 
opinion shifts about the environment. For example, left wingers are significantly more likely 
to express environmental concern than right wingers (e.g., Kvaløy et al. 2012). However, a 
direct effect on environmental policy or media attention may not necessarily be present. The 
variable has a mean value of -0.005 and a standard deviation of 0.08. 
 
Variables and data sources – Environmental media coverage  
The third endogenous variable pertains to media coverage of environmental issues. Schmidt et 
al. (2013) compiled data on newspaper coverage of climate change for 1996-2010. The authors 
have chosen lead print media for the six countries comprising our sample as these can maximize 
‘circulation, reputation, or quality of journalism’ (Schmidt et al. 2013, p.7). Out of these media 
outlets, Schmidt et al. (2013, p.7) identified all articles that referred to climate change directly 
or indirectly, i.e., a ‘reference to climate change exists when: a) the keyword ‘climate’ appears 
in connection with words indicating change (i.e., change, development, warming, cooling); b) 
the article includes words synonymous with climate change, such as ‘greenhouse effect’ or 
‘global warming’; or c) when a global change of temperature is discussed.’ Finally, ‘the number 
                                                          
5 We assume that public concern over the environment positively correlates with public concern over climate 
change. We eventually opted for Eurobarometer data on environmental changes more generally due to the larger 
country-year coverage. In fact, there are only two Eurobarometer years that deal explicitly with climate change in 
our time period, one of them (1993) overlaps with the item on environmental concerns generally. Specifically, in 
Eurobarometer 39.1, the following question was included: ‘Can you tell me if the greenhouse effect (global 
warming) is a very serious problem (1), quite serious (2), or not very serious (3)?’ The pairwise correlation of this 
item with our non-inverted data on environmental concerns generally is r=0.7140 (with p=0.0061). 
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of articles referring to climate change was then related to the absolute number in order to 
calculate coverage of climate change as a proportion of the absolute number of articles by 
month in percent’ (Schmidt et al. 2013, p.8). As the original data only cover the period from 
1996 to 2010, we linearly (following the temporal trend in the original observation period) 
extended the data beyond 2010 and before 1996. The final variable has a mean value of 0.589 
(standard deviation of 0.623), indicating that climate change was on average covered by about 
0.6 percent of all articles. 
To instrument Media Coverage, we rely on lagged annual GDP growth from the World 
Bank Development Indicators, which define this variable as the ‘annual percentage growth rate 
of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 
2010 US Dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.’ If 
the media prioritize issues they see as important to readers or to what they conceive of as the 
national interest (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988), coverage of climate change should fall in periods 
of slow growth (Barkemeyer et al. 2017). The state of the economy may not directly be 
associated with either environmental policies or public opinion, though (Kachi et al. 2015; 
Bakaki and Bernauer 2018).6 This item has a mean value of 1.94 (standard deviation of 2.56). 
 
Empirical findings 
Table 1 summarizes the main results based on 3SLS. Columns 2-4 pertain to the different 
equations of the system: Column 2 has Policy Output as the dependent variable, Column 3 has 
Media Coverage as the outcome, while the dependent variable in Column 4 is Public Opinion 
Change. The parameter estimates can be interpreted directly, but to provide a more intuitive 
                                                          
6 Counterarguments suggest, however, that more direct relationships exist. For example, regulations, often blamed 
for poor economic growth, could directly shape public opinion (see also Scruggs and Benegal 2012, Kahn and 




interpretation of the main results, Figure 2 is a revised version of Figure 1 where only arrows 
that achieve statistically significant effects are retained. Finally, Figure 3 depicts the 
endogenous variables’ marginal effects on the outcome variable at each stage. 
 
Table 1. The triangular relationship between public concern for environmental issues, 
media coverage, and public policy output 
 
  Policy Output Media Coverage Public Opinion Change 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.377  0.867 -0.794 
 (0.114)*** (0.097)*** (0.079)*** 
Policy Outputt-1   0.045  0.011 
  (0.030) (0.027) 
Public Opinion Change  0.741  0.289  
 (0.404)* (0.107)***  
Media Coveraget-1  0.465  -0.369 
 (0.355)  (0.085)*** 
Disaster Onsett-1  0.870    
 (0.357)**   
GDP Growtht-1   0.063   
  (0.015)***  
Median Voter Change   -0.849 
   (0.436)* 
Temporal Trend  0.034  0.003  0.013 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.006)** 
Constant -67.710 -5.387 -25.758 
 (46.259) (11.798) (10.963) 
Obs. 77 77 77 
RMSE 1.263 0.340 0.301 
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
. 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 









Figure 2. Triangular relationship of policy output, public opinion, and mass media 
 
 












Note: Horizontal bars pertain to 90 percent confidence intervals; vertical bar pertains 
to marginal effect of 0.  
 
Table 1 shows that several of the endogenous items are strong predictors of each other. 
Specifically, Public Opinion Change positively correlates with renewable-energy policy 
outputs and it also influences Media Coverage positively. Interestingly, however, while Media 
Coverage does not seem to crucially influence policy outputs, it is a negatively-signed predictor 
of Public Opinion Change. Finally, Policy Output is unlikely to be a key driver of the public’s 
attitude toward environmental quality or the media’s coverage of it. As Figure 3 demonstrates, 
the magnitude of these effects is both substantively and statistically significant. When 
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increasing Public Opinion Change by one unit, i.e. when the public has become more favorable 
of environmental protection over the last year, the predicted number of energy policies 
introduced in the current year increases by about 0.74. At the same time, such a one-unit rise 
in Public Opinion Change leads to an increase of about 0.3 percent in the print-media coverage 
of climate change. And, finally, when paying attention to climate change in more articles by 
about 1 additional percentage point, the public will become less favorable towards 
environmental protection over the next year by about 0.37 units. The other links in Figure 3 are 
statistically insignificant (also Figure 2). 
This suggests that influences may not be fully simultaneous in that an effect flows from any 
one factor to another and the other way around. First, Public Opinion Change affects policy 
outputs, but there is little evidence for an effect flowing the other way. The latter can be 
explained by opposing mechanisms: while we argued for a negative influence from policy 
output to public opinion, it may also be plausible to expect a positive association if legislative 
output creates a new constituency and, thereby, induces a positive feedback loop. For example, 
the legislature may mandate renewable portfolio standards, while this may lead to the 
establishment of a renewable industry, and the public may begin to recognize its importance 
even more. If both this and our postulated mechanism are at work, they could cancel each other 
out, leading to the overall insignificance we report above. Second, Public Opinion Change 
positively influences what media cover. Third, while we find support for Media Coverage 
influencing the public’s attitudes toward the environment, the estimated effect is negative i.e., 
the more the media address environmental issues, the more uninterested citizens become in the 
issue. This seems unexpected, but it may be consistent with some mechanisms identified in the 
literature on the psychology of climate-change denial (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2001): when 
extensive media coverage occurs, citizens who feel that there is little they can do about it may 
experience cognitive dissonance, leading to denial of the scientific consensus about climate 
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change and/or of any individual responsibility; and, if widespread enough, these reactions 
could lead to loss of public support. Fourth, policy outputs neither influence media coverage 
nor public opinion. Finally, the ‘positive’ relationship between public opinion and policy 
outputs means that if the salience of environmental issues increases in the public’s view, we 
observe more policy outputs. This also means, however, that lower salience put on the 
environment by the public induces less legislative action. And this is where the media come in 
– with a negative indirect effect: media coverage does not directly shape policy outputs, but 
indirectly via public opinion. Eventually, this leads to the chain of more media attention leading 
to less environmental salience in the public, which then induces less environmental policy 
action. Note, however, that media coverage is not significantly related to policy outputs directly 
and, hence, there is no contradiction in the results as such. 
 
Conclusion 
This article contributes to the literature by modeling a triangular system of reciprocal ties 
linking policy output, media attention, and public opinion about environmental quality. It is 
our belief that making this key advance over previous work could shed new light on how 
policymaking is related to public opinion, the media, and the other way around. Our findings, 
based on the analysis of six European democracies in 1983-2012, partially support this 
expectation: policy outputs are driven by public opinion when controlling for the persistent 
endogeneity, while public concern for the environment also shapes what the media covers. In 
turn, the latter affects whether citizens view environmental quality as a salient concern, 
although we found the effect to be negative. And while policy output is then driven, directly 
and indirectly, by public opinion and media coverage, it does not affect the others as a predictor. 
An intriguing finding from our study is that media coverage negatively influences public 
opinion. It is possible that the public simply suffers from ‘news fatigue’ in relation to climate 
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change coverage: the more the issue is covered, the more hopeless things look and the more 
pointless individual action may seem; cognitive dissonance sets, leading to the thought that the 
problem is not important. Our measure of media coverage purely concerns the amount, not the 
specific content, though. As noted above, climate-skeptical newspaper coverage does occur in 
Europe, and it is possible that more detailed content analysis would uncover links between it 
and public support.   
By relying on and analyzing data from the Eurobarometer, we also add to the discussion 
about the value and limitations of survey-based research. The Eurobarometer is one of the most 
methodologically rigorous regional cross-national survey projects, having the key advantage 
of standardized survey practices across rounds. However, the Eurobarometer is not free of 
methodological criticism, and it may be problematic when trying to draw inferences about 
individual-level parameters: the macro-level correlation of a variable with an item that is 
strictly speaking measured at the individual level may lead to the wrong inferences. In addition, 
the Eurobarometer does not interview the same individuals over time, while it only captures a 
set of relatively high-developed, democratic states in which media and public opinion function 
relatively independently. This may also limit the generalizability of these data.  
Future work should study more thoroughly the scope conditions of our triangular system. 
For instance, we claim that public interest in environmental policies declines once policies are 
in place. However, this may be linked to the effectiveness of the policies – public interest may 
not decrease if, e.g., policy outputs are ineffective in addressing an environmental problem 
(Johnson et al. 2005). We might also examine spillover effects, e.g., developments in policy 
abroad could influence ‘home’ policy making, media coverage, or public opinion. Moreover, 
more detailed content analysis able to distinguish between coverage along a spectrum from that 
liable to provoke public concern to denial at the other end is needed. Finally, it seems plausible 
that online newspapers spot public demand more easily and accurately than ‘paper only’ 
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outlets, which we focus on. A crucial aspect for addressing those avenues for future research 
will be data availability and more comprehensive efforts: our setup comprises fewer than 100 
observations – more data are clearly necessary, in particular for media coverage and attention. 
From a policy perspective, our research highlights two crucial aspects. On one hand, we find 
evidence that policymakers react to what the public wants. Hence, the importance of the median 
voter in states’ policymaking remains to be strong. It is, therefore, not the case, at least in our 
sample, that politicians ignore the demands of their electorate – this is good news for the 
validity of core democratic principles when subscribing to the claim that the wider public is 
the sovereign in democratic forms of government (Rasmussen et al. 2018). On the other hand, 
indirect influences and effects from other factors, most importantly the media, should not be 
neglected. While public opinion shapes policy output, the former is driven by and affects the 
media. For instance, environmental groups may make use of our research to more fully 
understand the given dynamics to shift public opinion as a means to catalyze the passage of 
renewable energy policy at the federal level (also Anderson et al. 2017). Correspondingly, for 
fully understanding how environmental policy is made and implemented, policymakers, public 
institutions, and analysts must take more strongly the complex set of influences surrounding 
all elements of policy output, media coverage, and public opinion into account.  
 
References 
Agnone J., 2007. Amplifying public opinion: The policy impact of the US environmental 
movement. Social Forces, 85(4), 1593-1620. 
Anderson, S., 2011. Complex constituencies: Intense environmentalists and representation. 
Environmental Politics, 20(4), 547-565. 
Anderson, B., Böhmelt, T., and Ward, H., 2017. Public opinion and environmental policy 
output: A cross-national analysis. Environmental Research Letters, 12(114011), 1-10. 
22 
 
Arnold, A., et al., 2016. European perceptions of climate change (EPCC): Socio-political 
profiles to inform a cross-national survey in France, Germany, Norway, and the UK. 
Oxford: Climate Outreach. 
Bättig, M. and Bernauer, T., 2009. National institutions and global public goods: Are 
democracies more cooperative in climate change policy? International Organization, 63(2), 
281-308. 
Bakaki, Z. and Bernauer, T., 2017a. Do global climate summits influence public awareness and 
policy preferences concerning climate change? Environmental Politics, 26(1), 1-26. 
Bakaki, Z. and Bernauer, T., 2017b. Citizens show strong support for climate policy, but are 
they also willing to pay? Climatic Change, 145(1-2), 15-26. 
Bakaki, Z. and Bernauer, T., 2018. Do economic conditions affect public support for 
environmental policy? Journal of Cleaner Production, 195(1), 66-78. 
Barkemeyer, R., et al., 2017. Media coverage of climate change: An international comparison. 
Environment and Planning C, 35(6), 1029-1054. 
Barnes, L. and Hicks, T., 2018. Making austerity popular: The media and mass attitudes toward 
fiscal policy. American Journal of Political Science, 62(2), 340-354. 
Baum, M.A. and Potter, P.B., 2008. The relationships between mass media, public opinion, 
and foreign policy: Toward a theoretical synthesis. Annual Review of Political Science, 
11(1), 39-65. 
Baumgartner, F., 2006. Punctuated equilibrium theory and environmental policy. In: 
Punctuated equilibrium and the dynamics of US environmental policy, edited by R. Repetto. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 24-46. 
Bechtel, M., and Hainmueller, J., 2011. How lasting is voter gratitude? An analysis of the short 




Böhmelt, T., Böker, M., and Ward, H., 2016. Democratic inclusiveness, climate policy outputs, 
and climate policy outcomes. Democratization, 23(7), 1272-1291. 
Böhmelt, T. and Butkutė, E., 2018. The self-selection of democracies into treaty design: 
Insights from international environmental agreements. International Environmental 
Agreements, 18(3), 351-367. 
Boswell, J., et al., 2019. What can political ethnography tell us about anti-politics and 
democratic disaffection? European Journal of Political Research, 58(1), 56-71. 
Boykoff, M., 2007. Flogging a dead norm? Newspaper coverage of anthropogenic climate 
change in the United States and United Kingdom from 2003 to 2006. Area, 39(4), 470-481. 
Boykoff, M., 2013. Public enemy no. 1? Understanding media representations of outlier views 
on climate change. American Behavioral Scientist, 57(6), 796-817. 
Boykoff, M. and Boykoff, J., 2004. Balance as bias: Global warming and the US prestige 
press. Global Environmental Change, 14(2), 125-136. 
Boykoff, M. and Mansfield, M., 2008. ‘Ye olde hot aire:’ Reporting on human contributions 
to climate change in the UK tabloid press. Environmental Research Letters, 3(2), 024002. 
Cao, X. and Ward, H., 2015. Winning coalition size, state capacity, and time horizons: An 
application of modified selectorate theory to environmental public goods provision. 
International Studies Quarterly, 59(2), 264-279. 
Cao, X. and Ward, H., 2017. Transnational climate governance networks and domestic 
regulatory action. International Interactions, 43(1), 76-102. 
Davis, A., 2002. Public relations democracy: public relations, politics and the mass media in 
Britain. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Dearing, J.W. and Rogers E., 1996. Communication concepts 6: Agenda-setting. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
24 
 
Dolan, P., et al., 2012. Influencing behavior: The mindspace way. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 33(1), 264-277. 
Downs, A., 1972. Up and down with ecology – The ‘issue-attention cycle.’ Public Interest, 
28(2), 38-50. 
Drews, S. and Van den Bergh, J., 2016. What explains public support for climate policies? A 
review of empirical and experimental studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 855-876. 
Edwards, G.C. and Wood, B.D., 1999. Who influences whom? The president, Congress, and 
the media. American Political Science Review, 93(2), 327-344. 
Elsasser, S.W. and Dunlap, R.E., 2013. Leading voices in the denier choir: Conservative 
columnists’ dismissal of global warming and denigration of climate science. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 57(6), 754-776. 
Elenbaas, M., et al., 2013. The impact of media coverage and motivation on performance-
relevant information. Political Communication, 30(1), 1-16. 
Gavin, N., 2009. Addressing climate change: A media perspective. Environmental Politics, 
18(5), 765-780. 
Geels F., 2013. The impact of the financial-economic crisis on sustainability transitions: 
Financial investment, governance, and public discourse. Environmental Innovation and 
Societal Transitions, 6(1), 67-95. 
Gupta, K. and Jenkins-Smith, H., 2015. Anthony Downs’ ‘Up and down with ecology: The 
issue-attention cycle.’ In: The Oxford handbook of classics in public policy and 
administration, edited by Balla, S.J., Lodge, M., and Page, E. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Herbst, S., 2002. How state-level policy managers ‘read’ public opinion. In: Navigating public 
opinion: Polls, policy and the future of American democracy, edited by Manza, J., Cook, 
F.L., and Page, B.I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
25 
 
Holt, D. and Barkemeyer, R., 2012. Media coverage of sustainable development issues-
attention cycles or punctuated equilibrium? Sustainable Development, 20(1), 1-17. 
Hilgartner, S. and Bosk, C., 1988. The rise and fall of social problems: A public arenas model. 
American Journal of Sociology, 94(1), 53-78. 
Iyengar, S. and Kinder, D.R., 2010. News that matters: Television and American opinion. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Johnson, M., Brace, P., and Arceneaux, K., 2005. Public opinion and dynamic representation 
in the American states: The case of environmental attitudes. Social Science Quarterly, 86(1), 
87-108. 
Jones, B. and Baumgartner, F., 2012. From there to here: Punctuated equilibrium to the general 
punctuation thesis to a theory of government information processing. Policy Studies, 40(1), 
1-19. 
Joslyn, M.R. and Haider-Markel, D.P., 2002. Framing effects on personal opinion and 
perception of public opinion: The cases of physician-assisted suicide and social security. 
Social Science Quarterly, 83(3), 690-706. 
Kachi, A., Bernauer, T. and Gampfer, R., 2015. Climate policy in hard times: Are the 
pessimists right? Ecological Economics, 114(1), 227-241. 
Kahan, D.M., et al., 2012. The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived 
climate change risks. Nature Climate Change, 2(10), 732-735. 
Kahn, M.E., and Kotchen, M.J. 2011. Business cycle effects on concern about climate change: 
the chilling effect of recession. Climate Change Economics, 2(3), 257-273. 
Kepplinger, H.M., 2007. Reciprocal effects: Toward a theory of mass media effects on decision 
makers. International Journal of Press/Politics, 12(3), 3-23. 
26 
 
Krosnick, J.A., et al., 2006. The origins and consequences of democratic citizens’ policy 
agendas: A study of popular concern about global warming. Climatic Change, 77(1-2), 7-
43.  
Kvaløy, B., Finseraas, H. and Listhaug, O., 2012. The publics’ concern for global warming: A 
cross-national study of 47 countries. Journal of Peace Research, 49(1), 11-22. 
Lewis, J., Williams, A., and Franklin, B., 2008a. A compromised fourth estate? UK news 
journalism, public relations, and news sources. Journalism Studies, 9(1), 1-20. 
Lewis, J., Williams, A., and Franklin, B., 2008b. Four rumors and an explanation: A political 
economic account of journalists’ changing newsgathering and reporting practices. 
Journalism Practice, 2(1), 27-45. 
Liu, X., Lindquist, E., and Vedlitz, A., 2011. Explaining media and congressional attention to 
global climate change, 1969-2005: An empirical test of agenda-setting theory. Political 
Research Quarterly, 64(2), 405-419. 
Lloyd, J., 2004. What the media are doing to our politics? London: Constable and Robinson. 
McCombs, M., 2005. A look at agenda-setting: Past, present and future. Journalism Studies, 
6(4), 543-557. 
Meyer, T. and Hinchman, L., 2002. Media democracy: How the media colonize politics. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Murphy, J. and Devine, D. 2019. Does media coverage drive public support for UKIP or does 
public support for UKIP drive media coverage? British Journal of Political Science, 
Forthcoming. 
Neumayer, E., Plümper, T. and Barthel, F., 2014. The political economy of natural disaster 
damage. Global Environmental Change, 24(1), 8-19. 
Oehl, B., Schaffer, L., and Bernauer, T., 2017. How to measure public demand for policies 
when there is no appropriate survey data? Journal of Public Policy 37(2), 173-204. 
27 
 
Oreskes, N., et al., 2018. The denial of global warming. In: The Palgrave handbook of climate 
history, edited by White, S., Pfister, C., and Mauelshagen, F. London: Palgrave. 
Painter, J. and Ashe, T., 2012. Cross-national comparison of the presence of climate scepticism 
in the print media in six countries, 2007-10. Environmental Research Letters, 7(4), 044005. 
Perloff, R.M., 2002. Third-person effect research 1983-1992: A review and synthesis. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 5(2), 167-184.  
Rasmussen, A., Reher, S., and Toshkov, D. 2018. The opinion-policy nexus in Europe and the 
role of political institutions. European Journal of Political Research: Forthcoming. 
Schaffer, L. and Bernauer, T., 2014. Explaining government choices for promoting renewable 
energy. Energy Policy, 68(1), 15-27. 
Schmidt, A., Ivanova, A., and Schäfer, M., 2013. Media attention for climate change around 
the world: A comparative analysis of newspaper coverage in 27 countries. Global 
Environmental Change, 23(5), 1233-1248. 
Scruggs, L. and Benegal, S., 2012. Declining public concern about climate change: Can we 
blame the great recession? Global Environmental Change, 22(2), 505-515. 
Sevenans, J., 2018. How mass media attract political elites’ attention. European Journal of 
Political Science, 57(1), 153-170. 
Siebert, F.S., Peterson, T. and Schramm, W., 1956. Four theories of the press. Chicago, IL: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Slovic, P., 2000. The perception of risk. London: Routledge. 
Soroka, S. and Wlezien, C., 2010. Degrees of democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Stimson, J., MacKuen, M., and Erikson, R., 1995. Dynamic representation. American Political 
Science Review, 89(3), 543-565. 
28 
 
Stoll-Kleemann, S., O’Riordan, T., and Jaeger, C., 2001. The psychology of denial concerning 
climate mitigation measures: evidence from Swiss focus groups. Global Environmental 
Change, 11(2), 107-117. 
Trenz, H., 2004. The democratizing dynamics of a European public sphere. European Journal 
of Social Theory, 7(1), 5-25. 
Vandeweerdt, C., Kerremans B., and Cohn A., 2016. Climate voting in the US Congress: The 
power of public concern. Environmental Politics, 25(2), 268-288. 
Walgrave, S. and Dejaeghere Y., 2016. Surviving information overload: How elite politicians 
select information. Governance, 30(2), 229-244. 
Walgrave, S. and Van Aelst, P., 2006. The contingency of the mass media’s political agenda 
setting power: Toward a preliminary theory. Journal of Communication, 56(1), 88-109. 
Weaver A., 2008. Does protest behavior mediate the effects of public opinion on national 
environmental policies? A simple question and a complex answer. International Journal of 
Sociology, 38(3), 108-125. 
Wlezien, C., 1995. The public as thermostat: Dynamics of preferences for spending. American 
Journal of Political Science, 39(4), 981-1000. 
Wlezien, C., 2004. Patterns of representation: Dynamics of public preferences and policy.  
Journal of Politics, 66(1), 1-24. 
Yanovitzky, I., 2002. Effects of news coverage on policy attention and actions: A closer look 




The triangular relationship between public concern for 
environmental issues, policy output, and media attention – Appendix 
 
Assessing model specifications 
We also assessed whether the 3SLS estimation approach is valid and performed a series of 
tests. First, our instruments should be significant predictors for explaining the respective 
outcome variables they are directly connected to, but not the other endogenous factors. Table 
1 in the main text demonstrates that the former applies, i.e., each instrument is statistically 
significant at conventional levels in its respective equation, while Table A.1 addresses the 
latter: we summarize the instruments’ coefficient estimates and standard errors when regressing 
the other endogenous outcomes on them one at a time. As demonstrated in this table, none of 
the instruments is statistically significantly related to the other endogenous variables, i.e., an 
influence occurs only indirectly via the endogenous item they directly shape, which then affects 
the other outcomes.  
Second, we test for the endogeneity of the three outcome variables. To this end, we first 
calculated the residuals for each stage (fully specified equations as in Table 1 of the main text) 
and then added these as a predictor to the other stages. Eventually, we end up with three 
regression estimations that are similar to the equations specified for our core model except that 
the residuals of equations 2 and 3 are added to equation 1, the residuals of equations 1 and 3 
are added to equation 2, and the residuals of equations 1 and 3 are added to equation 3. If the 
coefficient on the residuals is statistically different from 0, the corresponding variable is indeed 
endogenous. Table A.2 summarizes the residuals’ coefficients and standard errors at each 
stage: the residuals are mostly statistically significant, although the residuals are not 
statistically significant in the equation on Public Opinion Change. While conducting a 3SLS 
analysis seems still warranted, this test may provide some preliminary evidence that influence 
flows only in one direction for Public Opinion Change. 
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Table A.1. Reduced-form regressions 
 
  Policy Output Media Coverage Public Opinion Change 
Disaster Onsett-1   0.153 -0.183 
  (0.153) (0.119) 
GDP Growtht-1 -0.050   0.021 
 (0.079)  (0.022) 
Median Voter Change  1.503   0.848 
 (2.490)  (0.876) 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table A.2. Testing for endogeneity 
 
  Policy Output Media Coverage Public Opinion Change 
Residuals Policy Output   0.095  0.028 
  (0.032)*** (0.032) 
Residuals Media Coverage  1.400  -0.124 
 (0.468)***  (0.123) 
Residuals Public Opinion Change  0.771 -0.360  
 (0.697) (0.183)*  
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed). 
 
Finally, to test for over-identifying restrictions, we examine whether our instruments are 
correlated with the second-stage residuals. Hence, we estimated a regression using the residuals 
from Table 1 in the main text as the dependent variable and the instruments as the only 
explanatory variables. The instruments in this last test are all statistically insignificant, which 
is further supported by the F-test (F=0.100; p>F=0.9995). In sum, the specification of our 3SLS 
model seems generally adequate in that the instruments directly influence their respective 
outcomes, but not the other endogenous variables, as the three components of the triangular 
system mostly seem to be endogenous to each other, and since we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of the test for over-identification and do not conclude that at least some of the IVs 
are not exogenous. Having said that, Public Opinion Change is somewhat of an outlier and, 
according to Table A.2, less endogenous to the other variables in the triangular system.  
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Table A.3. The triangular relationship between public concern for environmental 
issues, media coverage, and public policy output, 1990-2012 
 
  Policy Output Media Coverage Public Opinion Change 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.377  0.892 -0.835 
 (0.130)*** (0.112)*** (0.108)*** 
Policy Outputt-1   5.187  0.009 
  (3.378) (0.030) 
Public Opinion Change  1.093 36.240  
 (0.522)** (13.605)***  
Media Coveraget-1  0.005  -0.004 
 (0.004)  (0.001)*** 
Disaster Onsett-1  1.021    
 (0.473)**   
GDP Growtht-1   7.407   
  (1.768)***  
Median Voter Change   -1.567 
   (0.693)** 
Temporal Trend  0.038 -1.100  0.029 
 (0.045) (1.157) (0.011)*** 
Constant -76.071 2192.179 -57.292 
 (89.488) (2314.787) (22.275)*** 
Obs. 60 60 60 
RMSE 1.410 37.492 0.321 
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed). 
 
Examining different time periods 
The data setup in the main text is, as discussed, not without issues. Variable values for some 
country-years are linearly interpolated, some of our core variables are only available for a more 
limited time period, and the patterns we identify may apply to states and years outside the time 
period 1983-2012 as well. To this end, we examined two additional model specifications that 
are based on different periods of time and, thus, circumvent some of the issues associated with 
the main model’s sample: first, we omit all country-years before 1990 and, second, all country-
years before 1996 are discarded from the analysis. These robustness checks take into account 
that the media-coverage data are interpolated before 1996 and that not that many renewable-
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energy policies were implemented before 1990. Tables A.3 (1990-2012) and A.4 (1996-2012) 
summarize our findings.   
 
Table A.4. The triangular relationship between public concern for environmental 
issues, media coverage, and public policy output, 1996-2012 
 
  Policy Output Media Coverage Public Opinion Change 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.391  0.858 -0.863 
 (0.137)*** (0.109)*** (0.114)*** 
Policy Outputt-1   6.561  0.015 
  (3.228)** (0.031) 
Public Opinion Change  1.026  35.099  
 (0.542)* (12.747)***  
Media Coveraget-1  0.006  -0.005 
 (0.005)  (0.001)*** 
Disaster Onsett-1  1.140    
 (0.544)**   
GDP Growtht-1   5.565   
  (1.735)***  
Median Voter Change   -1.722 
   (0.728)** 
Temporal Trend -0.023 -6.923  0.017 
 (0.085) (2.080)*** (0.020) 
Constant  46.802 13890.91 -33.110 
 (170.986) (4172.151)*** (39.237) 
Obs. 54 54 54 
RMSE 1.473 35.646 0.332 
P > χ2 0.015 0.000 0.000 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed). 
 
The substantive conclusions we discuss in the main text remain robust and there are virtually 
no differences in comparison to the main model. Essentially, the only key change pertains to 
the public-opinion variable in the media-coverage equation when looking at the 1996-2012 
period: Public Opinion Change is now statistically significant, emphasizing that changes in the 
public mood also shape what the media covers. As expected, the relationship is positive, i.e., 
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more environmental concern in people’s views induces more media reporting about climate 
change. 
 
Alternative data for policy outputs 
The main text’s analysis is based on policy-output data from the IRENA/IEA global renewable 
energy policies database. However, there are two problems associated with these particular 
data. First, these data may be too distant from actually addressing climate change as such, 
which is our theoretical focus when talking about environmental issues, media coverage, and 
even the public attitude. Second, except for Germany, not many countries implemented 
renewable-energy policies before the mid-1990s. As a result, we considered replacing the 
IRENA/IEA global renewable energy policies database by the database ‘Addressing Climate 
Change.’7 These data comprise all national policies that address climate change – not only 
renewable-energy aspects. The pairwise correlation of the two variables is, not surprisingly, 
quite high with r=0.4160. To meet the estimator’s requirements for the instrument, i.e., to 
ensure that Disaster Onset is still a valid instrument for the new policy-output variable, we 
transformed missing values of the alternative indicator into 0s, recoded it into a binary variable, 
and re-estimated the core model. The findings are presented in Table A.5. 
This robustness check does not produce results that differ from those discussed in the main 
text. Even all instruments perform similarly in terms of direction of influence and statistical 
significance. What seems worth mentioning, though, is the positive and significant impact of 
Policy Output in the equation pertaining to Media Coverage: this relationship is now truly 
simultaneous in that policy outputs seem to increase media coverage, but also more media 
coverage leads to a higher likelihood of climate-change policies being introduced. 
Table A.5. The triangular relationship between public concern for environmental 
issues, media coverage, and public policy output, alternative policy data 
                                                          




  Policy Output Media Coverage Public Opinion Change 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.352  0.873 -0.785 
 (0.127)*** (0.093)*** (0.079)*** 
Policy Outputt-1   28.788  0.001 
  (15.551)* (0.142) 
Public Opinion Change  0.143  22.826  
 (0.087)* (10.549)**  
Media Coveraget-1  0.002  -0.004 
 (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Disaster Onsett-1  0.236    
 (0.077)**   
GDP Growtht-1   5.938   
  (1.520)***  
Median Voter Change   -0.823 
   (0.441)* 
Temporal Trend  0.012 -0.571  0.014 
 (0.007)* (0.824) (0.008)* 
Constant -24.424  1116.798 -26.938 
 (13.552)* (1638.007) (15.732)* 
Obs. 77 77 77 
RMSE 0.270 33.213 0.302 
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed). 
 
Changes in media coverage 
Punctuated-equilibrium theory suggests, as discussed in the main text, that changes in public 
opinion are the decisive factor. We do not have a similar argument or expectation for media 
coverage. That said, in the robustness check summarized in Table A.6, we look at the changes of 
media coverage rather than yearly levels.  
 
 
Table A.6. The triangular relationship between public concern for environmental 




  Policy Output Media Coverage Public Opinion Change 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.347  0.069 -0.692 
 (0.111)*** (0.123) (0.086)*** 
Policy Outputt-1   2.638 -0.013 
  (3.050) (0.030) 
Public Opinion Change  0.967  26.734  
 (0.420)** (11.700)**  
Media Coveraget-1  0.010  -0.002 
 (0.004)**  (0.001)* 
Disaster Onsett-1  0.742    
 (0.358)**   
GDP Growtht-1   6.659   
  (1.639)***  
Median Voter Change   -0.642 
   (0.493) 
Temporal Trend  0.065 -0.034 -0.001 
 (0.022)*** (0.566) (0.005) 
Constant -129.105  44.756  2.850 
 (43.382)*** (1129.524) (10.897) 
Obs. 77 77 77 
RMSE 1.229 34.215 0.330 
P > χ2 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed). 
 
In some aspects, the results remain robust. In particular, this applies to the equation on policy 
outputs. However, the lagged dependent variable in the media-coverage equation has become 
statistically insignificant, while the estimates in the public-opinion equation of our model are 
mostly inconclusive, including the coefficient of the median-voter item. Ultimately, as we have 
little theoretical guidance to assume that changes in media coverage would matter, we have 
more confidence in the results based on the level of media coverage of climate change, which 





Table A.7. The triangular relationship between public concern for environmental 
issues, media coverage, and public policy output, controlling for treaties of the 
European Union 
 
  Policy Output Media Coverage Public Opinion Change 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.382  0.847 -0.822 
 (0.114)*** (0.086)*** (0.081)*** 
Policy Outputt-1   5.425  0.009 
  (2.665)** (0.027) 
Public Opinion Change  0.720  19.969  
 (0.410)* (9.542)**  
Media Coveraget-1  0.004  -0.004 
 (0.004)  (0.001)*** 
Disaster Onsett-1  0.896    
 (0.360)**   
GDP Growtht-1   5.750   
  (1.347)***  
Median Voter Change   -0.922 
   (0.432)** 
Temporal Trend -0.017 -5.776  0.009 
 (0.063) (1.497)*** (0.015) 
Maastricht Treaty  0.025  43.224 -0.219 
 (0.717) (17.000)*** (0.174) 
Amsterdam Treaty  1.065  90.318  0.305 
 (1.047) (24.690)*** (0.241) 
Constant  33.375  11454.730 -17.241 
 (125.446) (2973.725)*** (29.984) 
Obs. 77 77 77 
RMSE 1.254 29.833 0.295 
P > χ2 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed). 
 
Controlling for treaties of the European Union 
Especially in the area of energy and environment, the European Union (EU) is a critical 
catalyzer of policy outputs. EU-commanded policies can also have significant effects on the 
other factors in the triangular relationship we argue for. For example, public environmental 
concern may increase in response to such stimulus from the EU. Or, in contrast, in EU-skeptic 
countries, EU-policy demands may be frowned upon by the public and decrease public support 
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for environmental policies. As a robustness check, we thus ran our analysis while controlling 
for the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, respectively. We created 
two binary variables to this end: one receiving values of 1 as of the year 1991 (0 otherwise) 
and a second item with values of 1 for the year 1997 and afterwards. The first variable then 
captures the influence of the Maastricht Treaty, while the second one controls for the effects 
stemming from the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
According to Table A.7, our key findings are robust, but there are some interesting patterns 
for the two major EU agreements: while either treaty does not seem to crucially influence 
public opinion or policy outputs, we find strong and significant effects for the two variables in 
the media-coverage equation. In substantive terms, with the conclusion of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, respectively, the coverage of climate change by mainstream 
media has significantly increased. 
 
Table A.8. Disaggregation of environmental policy output 
 
Economic instruments Guarantee Scheme for Geothermal Energy,  Netherlands 2009 
Information and education Royal Decree Law 13/2012, Spain 2012 
Policy support National Renewable Action Plan (NREAP), Ireland 2010 
Regulatory instruments Renewable Energies Heat Act (EEWärmeG), Germany 2009 
Research and development Research Councils Energy Programme (RCEP), UK 2004 
Voluntary approaches Retailer Sustainable Commerce Agreement, France 2008 
 
Overview of environmental policy output 
For the main analysis, we use the IRENA/IEA Global Renewable Energy Policies and 
Measures database. As discussed there, we concentrate on national policies and measures 
pertaining to one of the following categories: economic instruments, information and 
education, policy support, regulatory instruments, research and development, and voluntary 
approaches. In Table A.8, we provide examples for each of these categories that are part of our 
data sample. 
